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Abstract 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are a major force in the Chinese economy and a growing presence in 
international trade and investment. The challenge to the WTO legal regime is commercial, given their 
size and their share of Chinese output, and political, given worries that trade and investment by SOEs 
may be driven by public policy goals. And both challenges may be exacerbated by the murky world of 
Chinese SOEs. In this article I first review whether Chinese SOEs are a problem for the WTO, and 
whether more sunshine on their operations might be a useful discipline. I then ask what we know 
about SOEs inside the WTO, including in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. Since the answer is, 
not much, I consider whether mega-regional trade negotiations offer a better approach. My answer 
being negative, I finally consider whether an attempt to negotiate a WTO Reference Paper on SOEs 
might help. I conclude that transparency is likely to be a better discipline on the spillovers associated 
with SOEs than a search for binding rules, while also helping everyone better understand the 
efficiency effects. 
Keywords 
Subsidies, state-owned enterprises, transparency, informal law. 
 
 
  1 
Introduction* 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China are among the largest firms in the world, and yet we do not 
know much about them. The top three SOEs in China are ranked second, third and fourth on the 
Fortune 500 list of the world’s largest companies.1 The share of SOEs among the top ten Chinese 
firms at 96% exceeds that of any other country (OECD, 2015a, Figure 8.1). The tens of thousands of 
SOEs in China (144,700 at the end of 2011--see OECD, 2014, 147) are a major force in the Chinese 
economy and a growing presence in international trade and investment. The assumption of this special 
issue is that those SOEs pose a challenge for the World Trade Organization (WTO) legal regime. The 
challenge is commercial, given their size and their share of Chinese output, if the fact of state 
ownership combined with their sheer size affects the terms of competition. The challenge is political, 
given worries that trade and investment by SOEs may be driven by public policy goals rather than, or 
in addition to, commercial considerations. And both challenges may be exacerbated by the murky 
world of Chinese SOEs, in which even the number of such firms is uncertain, in part because of 
ambiguity even about the degree of state ownership or control needed to be called an SOE.  
In this article I first review whether Chinese SOEs are a problem for the WTO, and whether more 
sunshine on their operations might be a useful corrective. I then ask what we know about SOEs inside 
the WTO, including in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. Since the answer is, not much, I consider 
whether mega-regional trade negotiations offer a better approach. My answer being negative, I finally 
consider whether an attempt to negotiate a WTO Reference Paper on SOEs might help. I conclude that 
transparency is likely to be a better discipline on the spillovers associated with SOEs than a search for 
binding rules, while also helping everyone better understand the efficiency effects. 
What is the problem with Chinese SOEs? 
Are SOEs a problem? And are they a trade policy problem? If one is asking about national welfare—
that is, the economic efficiency of SOEs as a vehicle for achieving policy objectives in the many 
countries where they exist—then one might easily conclude that SOEs are a problem to be addressed 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which can get data from finance ministries, or by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which has an excellent set of 
guidelines. The Chinese government itself sees an efficiency problem, and has been reforming the 
sector for years—the objectives and process if not the results are well-described in successive WTO 
Trade Policy Review (TPR) reports on China. On the other hand, if one is asking about the trading 
system—that is, the potential for negative spillovers affecting other firms—then that would be a trade 
policy problem in the domain of the WTO. And either way, are Chinese SOEs a special case? These 
questions can appear to be ideological rather than empirical in the absence of data, which leads to the 
first reason to seek more transparency—we do not necessarily know enough about SOEs, especially in 
China, to be sure whether we have a problem, hence what ought to be done.  
Chinese SOEs are known to be highly indebted. The IMF is attentive to them in the Article IV 
consultations process, but mostly because of increasing worries about the overall impact of high levels 
of corporate debt—the SOE share of corporate debt in China is much higher than their share of 
economic output (IMF, 2016). If an SOE has preferential access to credit, on the one hand, the credit 
                                                     
*
 This article was prepared for the seminar on “State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in China: Trade and Competition Issues”, 
Columbia Law School, November 21, 2016. I am grateful to Thomas Bollyky, Cary Coglianese, Daniel Goldbloom, 
Bernard Hoekman, Petros Mavroidis and Charles Sabel, and to officials in Global Affairs Canada and the WTO 
Secretariat, for helpful suggestions that I draw on without further attribution. 
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 http://beta.fortune.com/global500/list/filtered?hqcountry=China accessed November 12, 2016; (WTO, 2016a, Table 
3.21 ).  
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not the recipient is the issue. On the other hand, the Secretariat does not know if the SOEs repay their 
loans, which could disadvantage foreign competitors.  
The OECD is also attentive to Chinese SOEs. A recent report provides an excellent summary of the 
history and evolution of Chinese SOEs including their role in the economy, governance structures, and 
the policy objectives assigned to them (OECD, 2015a, Chapter 5). The OECD has an active program 
on SOEs, in which China often participates (e.g. OECD, 2016b). The orientation is towards good 
corporate governance—how SOEs should be managed, and how the state can exercise oversight. The 
guidelines start with an expansive set of criteria that governments should consider when deciding 
whether an enterprise is “state-owned” (OECD, 2015b, 14-6). Transparency enters the guidelines only 
in the context of a particular company providing the same high quality reporting on its financial results 
as required of other companies—something that can be complicated when a firm is assigned both 
commercial and policy objectives (for the detailed suggestions on reporting, see OECD, 2015b, 24). 
From a trade policy standpoint, however, we mean something else by transparency. We want to know 
the extent to which state action, the only thing subject to WTO rules, alters the terms of competition.  
The other articles in this issue help us understand the challenges posed by Chinese SOEs for the 
WTO legal regime. We know that state-trading enterprises (STEs), which may or may not be SOEs, 
are subject to WTO rules, and why (Mastromatteo), though we know little about how well China 
complies with those rules. We know that SOEs are complex entities (Lin), that are deeply entwined in 
China, Inc., a complex web of overlapping networks and relationships, which is hard for outsiders to 
understand (Wu), making even the definition of SOE contestable. The problem was foreseen but not 
well handled in the 2001 Protocol of Accession (Levy), leading to conflict under the WTO subsidies 
and antidumping agreements (Qin, Prusa, Wu). That many provisions of the WTO are applicable to 
SOEs is not in doubt (Biau, Capobianco, Chammas, et al., 2016, 11-2), but these rules do not apply 
specifically to SOEs (Kawase, 2014). Mavroidis (2016b) barely even mentions SOEs because until 
recently, they have not been seen as a WTO problem. the actions of SOEs have occasioned some 
disputes, but the evolving WTO jurisprudence has simply confirmed the complexity of what is at take. 
Here I am thinking of whether SOEs are part of the state, hence subject to the same disciplines as the 
rest of the state apparatus, or whether an SOE is not necessarily a “public body”. The Appellate Body 
(DS379 and DS437) seems to think that, in the terms of the Agreement on Subsides and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM), we know a body exercising “governmental authority” by what it 
does, not by who owns it (Prusa and Vermulst, 2013, 199). The distinction may matter in the case of 
an SOE providing a subsidy, but does not help in assessing other ways in which SOEs might affect the 
commercial interests of foreign firms. Moreover, without more information on the universe of SOEs, 
and what they do, or even just their objectives, the distinction has little operational utility. 
Nevertheless, we know that the United States perceives a trade policy problem. Discipline on SOEs 
is an explicit objective articulated in the trade promotion authority granted the President in 2015 where 
the aim is to eliminate both trade distortions and unfair competition “through disciplines that eliminate 
or prevent discrimination and market-distorting subsidies and that promote transparency (United 
States, 2015).” Many analysts also believe that Chinese SOEs distort the terms of competition. We 
know that SOEs receive large state transfers, but we know less than we should about the rationale, or 
purposes to which the money is put (that is, the extent to which losses are being covered, on the one 
hand, or excess investment is encouraged for some public purpose, on the other). The concern with 
spillovers goes beyond the fact that SOEs do not confront a hard budget constraint, or perhaps have a 
monopoly position, because governments can attain similar outcomes through a variety of policy 
instruments, such as discriminatory entry regulation or implicit guarantees that limit the ability of 
private firms to contest the market. Subsidies can take many forms, from targeted taxation and access 
to credit through calibrated regulation, guided sourcing, golden shares, and policies that promote 
conglomerates.
2
 Without more information, we cannot understand the extent to which competition is 
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 This discussion of subsidies draws on Bernard Hoekman’s comments at the Columbia seminar.  
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affected by the intervention of the Chinese state, hence concerns about spillovers and efficiency persist. 
Such concerns are widespread about SOEs in general (Sultan Balbuena, 2016), and not just Chinese 
ones.  
Increasingly we also care about the spillovers from government influence when an SOE invests 
abroad. We want to know two things—whether that SOE brings unfair advantages to competition in 
foreign markets (for example if it has access to capital at home at below market rates that it uses to 
invest in the host market), and whether its decisions in host markets will be taken on 
nondiscriminatory commercial terms. The worry is that the policy objectives of a host government can 
be undermined by a foreign SOE acting in support of the policy objectives of its state owner. The 
latter is often phrased as a worry about whether an SOE investment compromises national security in 
some way. Should Canadians worry, for example, if a Chinese SOE became the owner of a major 
Canadian oil company? Would that company operate at the behest of the Chinese government in ways 
that might be inimical to Canadian security (Canada, 2012, 19)? Since 2012, Canadian policy under 
the Investment Canada Act requires “that the investor satisfies the Minister of the investment’s 
commercial orientation; freedom from political influence; adherence to Canadian laws, standards and 
practices that promote sound corporate governance and transparency; and positive contributions to the 
productivity and industrial efficiency of the Canadian business (Sauvant and Nolan, 2015).” 
In trying to understand how SOEs are a trade policy problem, I wondered if Canadian firms 
mention unfair competition from Chinese SOEs in the complaints they file under Section 20 of 
Canada’s Special Import Measures Act (SIMA). Such complaints can be a source of information in 
themselves as well as revealing if firms see a problem, and they can indicate if only by inference if 
lack of transparency is part of the problem. Section 20 of SIMA is the legal basis for the Canada 
Border Services Agency (CBSA) to treat an industry or sector in a designated country as operating on 
a non-market economy basis with respect to antidumping investigations if “domestic prices are 
substantially determined by the government of that country and there is sufficient reason to believe 
that they are not substantially the same as they would be if they were determined in a competitive 
market….” An SOE may be considered to constitute “government” for the purpose of a subsidy 
determination under SIMA “if it possesses, exercises, or is vested with, governmental authority.”3  
In a review of a selected number of recent cases, we found some where a firm alleged a subsidy 
connected with state ownership.
4
 In “Certain Fabricated Industrial Steel Components” 5  the 
complainants allege that purchases by SOEs affect the domestic price in China, which is in effect a 
subsidy. In “Certain Welded Large Diameter Line Pipe”6 The complaint provides evidence that eight 
of the top 10 steel companies in China are state-owned and that the government “has continuously 
pressured state-owned steel mills to avoid cutbacks in bids to maintain economic growth and 
employment, which in turn has been a contributing factor behind plummeting Chinese steel prices.” In 
“Certain Copper Tube Originating in or Exported from the People's Republic of China” 7  the 
complainant “provided evidence to demonstrate that the nonferrous industry in general and the copper 
sector in China are largely state-owned and/or controlled by the central government or by regional and 
local authorities” hence the government “through extensive use of industrial policies and measures, 
strongly influences the supply and price of refined copper.” In addition, “The CBSA compared the 
interest rate on the loans received with the benchmark interest rates and determined that ZJ Hailiang 
had received preferential interest rates from the state-owned banks.” Finally, in “Galvanized steel 
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 Para 122 Canada Border Services Agency FISC 2016 IN Statement of Reasons, Ottawa, September 27, 2016 
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/fisc2016/fisc2016-de-eng.html.  
4
 I am grateful for the research assistance of Sifat Syeda in completing this review.  
5
 para 13 Canada Border Services Agency FISC 2016 IN Statement of Reasons, Ottawa, September 27, 2016 
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/fisc2016/fisc2016-de-eng.html. 
6
 paras 85, 86, http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1408/ad1408-de-eng.html. 
7
 paras 102, 176 http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1401/ad1401-i13-pd-eng.html. 
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wire”,8 the CBSA observed that the Chinese government “has continuously pressured state-owned 
steel mills to avoid cutbacks in bids to maintain economic growth and employment, which in turn has 
been a contributing factor behind plummeting Chinese steel prices.” 
Canadian firms evidently see a problem of anti-competitive conditions in the Chinese market 
exacerbated by state ownership. In one case an SOE may have itself provided something that looks 
like a subsidy to another SOE. Officials agree on the existence of a problem, although the picture of 
that problem in the cases mentioned above is murky.
9
 And the solution is second best: unilateral trade 
remedy measures imposed by the Canadian authorities only offers relief against Chinese imports in 
Canada; such measures can do nothing about competition in China itself, which is also a concern 
expressed by Canadian firms, including Canadian investors in China. More transparency about SOEs 
would make it easier to understand their impact on the relevant markets, hence the extent to which 
SOEs are a trade policy problem. Would more transparency also enhance the disciplines on SOEs? 
Sunshine as a principle and a tool 
The core worry about SOEs is that they are subsidized by their governments. Formally binding 
discipline on subsidies is notoriously difficult, but informal law, can help (Shaffer, Wolfe and Le, 
2015). Can more sunshine help addresses the problems associated with SOEs? The first use of 
sunshine as a metaphor for transparency as a policy tool is attributed to the U.S. jurist Louis Brandeis. 
In writing about efforts to regulate finance, Brandeis (1914) stated, “Publicity is justly commended as 
a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light 
the most efficient policeman.” The Brandeis view assumes that agents whose actions are subject to 
public scrutiny will hew more closely to shared understandings of the common good. If not, other 
agents provided with information can exercise appropriate discipline. In this view of agency, sunlight 
contributes more to social order than does coercion. 
The purpose of transparency, an essential element of WTO institutional design, is to illuminate 
trade policy practices to the benefit of both governments and traders. Such transparency reduces the 
inherent information asymmetry when a government knows more about its domestic policies than do 
its trading partners. Here too the WTO role is analogous to that of any regulator, who needs 
information from the regulatee without which the regulator cannot know enough about a problem to be 
sure how to proceed. It begins with procedures Members ought to follow at home, such as publication 
of all measures affecting trade, and impartial administration of trade-related rules; if they do not 
follow such procedures, efforts to mitigate domestic obscurity by actions in Geneva will be more 
difficult. Transparency in Geneva takes three forms. The one that attracts the most notice of scholars is 
largely outside the scope of this paper—a complaint in the dispute settlement system draws attention 
to the trade policy practices of another Member. The other two forms are notification and surveillance 
through the committee structure, where consistency with obligations is the main consideration, and the 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), where the objective is “to contribute to ... the smoother 
functioning of the multilateral trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding 
of, the trade policies and practices of Members.”  
I have claimed elsewhere that transparency, in the form of good data and a forum for surveillance, 
can reduce the propensity to resort to dispute settlement (Wolfe, 2013), but the institutional design of 
transparency matters for its success as a policy tool. Two dimensions are especially important in the 
WTO—how the other Members are notified of a new policy action, the subject of dozens of 
notification requirements in the agreements; and how a notification is discussed in Geneva, which 
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 para 95 http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1397/ad1397-i13-fd-eng.html. 
9
 In the end the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) found injury in Certain Welded Large Diameter Line Pipe 
see http://www.citt.gc.ca/en/node/7861 and in Circular Copper Tube see http://www.citt-
tcce.gc.ca/dumping/inquirie/findings/nq2n004_e#P6_597, but the CITT found no injury in Galvanized Steel Wire.  
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happens in the many sectoral committees. Such meetings are opportunities for Members to learn more 
about the incidence of a particular policy, and to understand the rationale for their use. Transparency 
practices in the WTO are based on the principled belief that democratic governance and efficient 
markets are both enhanced when participants know what is going on, and when administrative 
agencies have a degree of autonomy, or independence from political interference, yet can be asked to 
give reasons for their actions. The one is effectively a constraint on the other: administrators must be 
free to get on with the job, but openness is a constraint on abuse of discretion.  
These western ideals of democratic governance are not shared by China. The government attempts 
to comply in a mechanical fashion with WTO publication requirements, including the translation into 
English of trade-related laws and regulations (WTO, 2016b, 69), and it is doing reasonably well in 
meeting its notification obligations. But transparency is far from being an embedded principle of 
governance (Potter, 2014, 24). Whether or not what Coglianese (2009) calls “fishbowl transparency” 
(where the public can be a fly on the decision maker’s wall) is a good idea, and he is dubious, such 
extreme transparency is not something the Chinese state will provide for the foreseeable future. What 
Coglianese calls “reasoned transparency” (asking officials to provide reasons for their decisions) is a 
worthy objective, though that too will not come quickly. And the problem goes far beyond SOEs. The 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration faces the same information problem with respect to China, and it 
matters more: U.S. regulators need to know about the safety of imports, including drugs and medical 
devices, but confidence in Chinese regulatory transparency and effectiveness was shaken by scandals 
involving unsafe food, unsafe toys and much else in the middle of the last decade (Delisle, 2009). The 
tension between western notions of the “responsible agency” of officials with traditional “patrimonial 
sovereignty” where officials are accountable to their superiors will not be resolved soon (Potter, 2014, 
37). When governance is relational, western process-oriented ideas have little purchase, which may 
explain why WTO transparency provides less discipline on Chinese SOEs than one might hope. 
How does WTO transparency actually work in this area? 
It follows from the discussion so far that discipline on SOEs ought to begin with notification of any 
subsidies that they receive or offer. Collins-Williams and Wolfe (2010) showed how the record of 
industrial subsidies notification under the ASCM was poor. It still is, in general, and especially with 
respect to SOEs. Why do Members not notify subsidies, in general? Four reasons can be advanced 
(Wolfe, 2013). The first is bureaucratic incapacity. Second, Members might worry about providing 
adverse information for a potential legal dispute, perhaps about a measure they suspect might be 
illegal. By notifying, they provide information that a trading partner might not have and they admit 
that the measures might be actionable. Third, Members’ trade authorities find it easier to notify actions 
taken by themselves than data on subsidies offered by other ministries, or other levels of government, 
or by SOEs. The fourth reason, and perhaps most important, is ambiguity about what requires 
notification.  
This ambiguity is evident in China’s notifications. On July 29, 2016, China tabled its latest “new 
and full notification” of subsidies under the ASCM (G/SCM/N/95/CHN/Suppl.), covering the period 
to the end of 2014. Given the distinction made in recent Appellate Body decisions, this notification is 
unlikely to contain any subsidies provided by SOEs, since China does not see them as “public bodies” 
whose measures would be subject to notification. Whether any SOE would be on the list as a recipient 
of subsidies is also unlikely, since the discipline applies to the source of funds not the recipient. A 
reverse notification would be possible, if a trading partner wished to argue that a Chinese subsidies 
program discriminated in favour of SOEs. 
As a result of the absence of any specific obligations applying to SOEs, little is known about them 
from regular notifications, or discussion in WTO committees. Given the missing incentives to notify, 
Mavroidis and Wolfe (2015) argue, one solution might be to enable a disinterested party to acquire 
and disseminate information as the common agent of all participants in the trading system. Some 
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Members may not need the help with respect to Chinese SOEs—the Americans obtain a lot of 
information from their offices in China, and many of their people speak Chinese, as do the staff of the 
American Chamber of Commerce in China (AmCham). The result is their periodic report on China’s 
WTO compliance (United States, 2014), but this report serves American interests. The WTO has 
multiple principals—164 member governments, but also citizens, and hundreds of millions of traders. 
Sunshine as now practiced does not properly enable these agents to discipline other agents who may 
not be playing by the rules. In order to ensure that such discipline is possible, two things are required, 
both of which can only come from a common agent: active efforts to (1) increase the amount of 
information available; and (2) make that information widely available in a useful way. A move toward 
increasing the role of the WTO Secretariat could be a useful response to the failure of Members to 
submit notifications, which implies a greater role for the TPRM. Is it up to the task? 
What do we know from TPR reports? 
The central objective of the TPRM is “to contribute to ... the smoother functioning of the multilateral 
trading system, by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and 
practices of Members.” In the periodic Trade Policy Review (TPR) of each Member, which in the case 
of China is completed every two years, the Secretariat sometimes warns or expresses concerns on the 
basis of its analysis, but never criticizes Members explicitly, and never comments on their rights and 
obligations under the WTO agreements. It follows from the TPR mandate that Members need to know 
enough about the overall picture of SOEs in a given country to understand their effect on the trading 
system. What we learn there is less than we might hope.  
The core of each TPR report is based on notifications from Members, but each report builds from a 
far wider range of information. If a country has been less than fully transparent in regular work, for 
whatever reason, it may not provide more information in the TPR. The Secretariat collects data from 
official sources (in addition to questionnaires to the Member under review) and non-official sources, 
including from other international organizations, media reports, academic analysis and NGOs. To 
ensure accuracy, the Secretariat seeks verification of the data from non-official sources when 
discussing the draft of its report with the Member. The nature of the TPR process creates an ongoing 
debate between the Chinese authorities, the WTO Secretariat, and other Members (who pose detailed 
questions when the report is discussed) about what counts as an SOE, and what information about 
them ought to be provided. The authorities learn from the debate about how to find and aggregate 
information in WTO terms, often because they want to dispute the information the TPR contains from 
other sources. 
The major problem for the TPR of China is how much the Secretariat does not know. Unlike the 
reports on other large emerging economies, like India, a highly transparent country, the reports on 
China may have significant gaps. Of course comparability of data on SOEs is a general problem given 
the different forms they take, and the sometimes divergent national classifications (Kowalski, Büge, 
Sztajerowska and Egeland, 2013, 64). The Secretariat tries to estimate transfers to SOEs but the 
Chinese government disputes the accuracy of the data. Even efforts to get a simple count of the major 
SOEs is hard because China distinguishes between state-owned, state controlled, and state-invested 
enterprises (WTO, 2016a, Table 3.19) hence the TPR uses OECD data. The Chinese authorities are 
most comfortable providing data about SOEs that are under the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), but in the 2016 TPR report only 106 
SOEs are said to be under SASAC, and yet tens of thousands of SOEs are known to exist. The 
successive TPR reports on China present a shifting and confusing picture of the role of SASAC and its 
influence due, in fairness, to the active reform program underway. 
What then do we learn about such spillovers from the 2016 TPR of China (WTO, 2016a)? Not 
much. This year’s TPR seems more descriptive than in the past, perhaps in response to pressures from 
the Chinese government. The section on STEs (3.172) notes that a new notification was submitted in 
Sunshine over Shanghai: Can the WTO illuminate the murky world of Chinese SOEs? 
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2015, but provides no detail, simply repeating the policy objectives as stated by the authorities. The 
report describes the responsibility of China’s official export credit agency (3.115) without assessing 
whether its support is provided at market rates, or rates under the OECD Export Credit Arrangement. 
One paragraph stands out. By digging through corporate filings
 
the Secretariat is able to say (3.179) 
that  
In 2014, 2,473 companies listed in the Shanghai and the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges received 
government support amounting to RMB 89.421 billion (up from RMB 75.783 billion in 2012). Of 
these companies, 154 received more than RMB 100 million in 2014; 105 of which were SOEs. 
Moreover, amongst the top 10 companies that received support in 2014 (for a total of RMB 17.306 
billion) nine were SOEs. 
The previous TPR (WTO, 2014) had only been able to say 
3.126. In addition to the programmes notified by China, there appear to be other support 
programmes and other means to support different industries (e.g. fisheries) including through the 
provision of grants, policy lending by state-owned banks and the supply of goods at lower than 
"market price" by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Table A3.6). However, in the context of this 
Review, no information was provided to the Secretariat regarding these specific programmes or 
China's industrial policies that supported different areas of the economy. Moreover, the 
identification of these programmes has not been possible for the Secretariat, as specific support 
measures seem to be the result of internal administrative measures that are not published in 
English. In addition, the Secretariat did not have access to an itemized central budget to be able to 
identify the outlays. 
When the report was discussed in the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB), this section caught the eye 
of the delegates of Chinese Taipei, the U.S., Canada, and Australia, who asked questions of China 
designed to elicit more information. In its replies (WT/TPR/M/300) the government denied that banks 
received any such direction from the government, or that any such support is provided to SOEs. The 
official Discussant of the report, Ambassador Joakim Reiter of Sweden, said that 
3.19 I am aware that China questions the accuracy of the Secretariat's description of its various 
programs. All countries will also have to make a sovereign decision on whether there may be 
specific sectors that warrant more government involvement, specifically for justifiable social or 
national security reasons (such as education, health, etc.). 
3.20 At the same time, in the case of China, neither SOEs nor government support programs seem 
to be limited to a few sectors. They are permeating the entire economy. And each and every one of 
these measures runs serious risks of affecting the allocation of resources. They also affect 
competitive conditions, between foreign companies and local companies, between large companies 
and small companies as well as between state-linked and private companies (foreign or local). It is 
equally striking that the Chinese competition law explicitly provides immunity for SOEs that are 
breaking the competition law if those SOEs are considered vital to the Chinese economy. To my 
mind, this is not only a matter for the functioning of the Chinese economy and market-place. 
Given China's size and importance, the interference of the Government in the economy may very 
well also affect the allocation of resources and competitive conditions of companies in markets 
outside China – thereby, casting a shadow over China's quest for open and fair trade. 
Two years later a new discussant reiterated the same concerns (WTO, 2016b, 3.19). While many 
questions were asked orally and in writing about SOEs, the answers again do not add much detail 
(WTO, 2016c).  
In sum, we learn from the TPR process that trading partners worry about the spillovers associated 
with Chinese SOEs, but the picture remains murky. I then wondered if this obscurity in the TPR is 
unique to China. For comparison I looked at the section on SOEs in the TPR report on the European 
Union, home to a great many such firms. The last report (WTO, 2015b) contains two pages on state 
enterprises. The report describes the EU rules on “public undertakings”, but all of its quantitative 
information comes from the OECD. That data is reasonably complete, because the EU member states 
are also members of the OECD, and participate in its work, including its database of SOEs (OECD, 
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2014). I then looked at the annual monitoring reports by the Director-General. That report mentions 
SOEs only when they come up in TPR reports on individual countries (WTO, 2015a). The report does 
have horizontal sections on various areas of WTO work, but always on the basis of activity in the 
relevant WTO body. Absent explicit WTO obligations in an area, the TPR reports are mute.  
In a sense that is as it should be. Members can only be accountable in Geneva for promises that 
they have made there (Wolfe, 2015). If Members of the WTO have not agreed on a definition, in the 
sense of which SOEs ought to be subject to discipline, and have not developed a shared understanding 
of how SOEs do or do not offend the nondiscrimination norms of the trading system, then they and the 
Secretariat will flounder in knowing what to be transparent about.  
Could mega-regional negotiations improve SOE transparency? 
With WTO negotiations stalled, regional negotiations became a forum for trying to advance 
disciplines on new issues, often explicitly designed to develop new rules without China (Wolfe, 2016). 
While the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement of early 2016 is now dead, or at least in limbo, it 
does contain the most extensive attempt of any preferential agreement to draft rules for SOEs, based in 
part on the provisions of the Singapore-U.S. FTA (Sylvestre and Marcoux, 2016, 17ff). Chapter 15 
of NAFTA is much more limited, while the focus of Chapter Eighteen of CETA is on non-
discrimination and commercial considerations in the operation of state enterprises and monopolies, not 
on subsidies, and it does not mention transparency. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) SOEs chapter would probably be similar to TPP, with a more sophisticated answer 
to the question of how much and what kind of state involvement would make an enterprise subject to 
the disciplines. The Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) chapter is similarly modeled on TPP. Indeed 
U.S. officials explicitly saw TPP texts on new issues as being a basis for further multilateral or 
plurilateral negotiations (Inside U.S. Trade, 2016). Australia and Canada also supported the TPP 
chapter; Canada is likely to use it during the exploratory talks now underway with China on a possible 
FTA. In this section I consider what we can learn from TPP about possible rules that could be adapted 
in some other agreement involving China.
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The TPP chapter on State-Owned Enterprises and Designated Monopolies has important provisions 
on non-discriminatory treatment in their commercial transactions in their own or other markets. But it 
is above all a subsidies chapter, although the word is not used there or anywhere else in TPP. The 
chapter attempts to address the problems that have arisen in the WTO by clarifying what an SOE is, 
based on the amount of state ownership or control, and what sort of measures ought to be constrained. 
It has one conventional notification obligation (Article 17.10.1) requiring publication of a list of a 
Party’s state-owned enterprises. Other Parties can challenge the absence of an entity from such a list, 
notably by raising the matter in the Committee, but it may be hard for anybody except the putative 
owner to know if an entity meets the definition.  
An ongoing description of the universe of SOEs could be useful, but the SOE chapter does not 
contain any further notification requirement, for example on non-commercial assistance offered, 
perhaps reflecting American frustration with the inadequacies of WTO notifications, as discussed 
above. What the U.S. pushed for instead was a provision that allows one Party to make a request for 
more information of another Party, in writing, with an explanation of how the activities of the entity 
may be affecting trade or investment between the Parties (Article 17.10.3 and 17.10.4). The type of 
information required in response to a written request (Article 17.10.5) tracks the requirements in the 
ASCM notification template (WTO, 2003), and is similar to that specified in the OECD Guidelines 
discussed above, although making it public could be difficult for some countries. The requirement for 
another Party to explain the possible effects on its interests eliminates the need for guesswork inherent 
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in the part of the ASCM notification template that asks the drafter of a notification to provide 
“Statistical data permitting an assessment of the trade effects of the subsidy.” Notifications rarely 
contain such information, perhaps, Collins-Williams and Wolfe (2010, 564) argued, because trade 
effects are best assessed by the affected actors.  
The provision of information in response to a question does not prejudge the legal status of any 
assistance (Article 17.10.8), but all the usual worries about notifications discussed above may arise. 
Moreover, the mandate of the Committee on State-Owned Enterprises and Designated Monopolies 
(Article 17.12) does not provide that it should receive or discuss notifications—which would be hard 
to do in any event since TPP would have no Secretariat. While the Committee could discuss entities 
that ought to have been mentioned on the list, such reverse notification will be ad hoc, and difficult for 
all but the best-informed governments. This weak institutional design of the TPP SOE transparency 
provisions (which is typical of the institutional provisions of TPP) means that observers who think it 
can “name and shame” the providers of subsidies (Miner, 2016, 341) are misinformed, because the 
supplementary information in the response to a question is not actually a notification; indeed the Party 
supplying the information can request that it be kept confidential (Article 17.10.9). It is not clear, 
therefore, that any of the TPP provisions except the list of SOEs (Article 17.10.1) would actually 
increase transparency. The Americans would be glad of any information received in response to a 
request, but transparency best provides discipline when sunshine illuminates the practices in question 
for all affected actors. 
Would China accept TPP provisions on SOEs? Some scholars think these provisions might help 
push the reform process along (Yun, 2016, 32), which probably gets it backwards: when the reform 
process is sufficiently advanced, the authorities will happily accept new disciplines. Other scholars 
think that the reform process now underway is too limited to allow Chinese leaders to agree to adopt 
the TPP’s high standards for SOEs (He, 2016, 16), although it is said that they have sought technical 
briefings to ensure that they understand the SOE provisions. What about the transparency provisions? 
It may be unrealistic to expect the Chinese to create an online list of every SOE, and even more 
unrealistic for any of their partners to try to provide written evidence of the trade effects of most SOEs 
on any eventual list in order to justify a request for more information—would even the Americans 
know enough about the tens of thousands of SOEs assumed to operate in China to pose such questions? 
Even if TPP comes into effect, some day, the transparency it could provide will be imperfect. 
Moreover, I think Wu (2016, 60) takes the wrong tack when he argues that even if China will never 
join, mega-regionals “offer a chance to establish norms, linked with additional preferential trade 
access for those that choose to accept them.” Norms and new rules ultimately arise in social 
interaction—if China is not part of the process, new texts will be a dead end as a means for dealing 
with China Inc.  
Would negotiations on an SOE Reference Paper be timely? 
The Americans and others evidently believe that SOEs are a trade policy problem, and that more 
transparency would help. If TPP is a dead end, how can we improve the WTO? The solution will not 
come through further dispute settlement cases on the meaning of “public body”, nor should Members 
wait to address the problem until it forms part of the single undertaking for the eventual successor to 
the Doha Round. In this section I justify plurilateral negotiations as a means to make explicit what is 
already implicit: since WTO disciplines do indeed cover SOEs, more transparency is possible. 
The WTO is a government-to-government contract, but some private behavior is regulated in the 
agreements—the antidumping agreement, for example, applies to the measures governments apply to 
foreign firms. The most salient example in the SOE context is anti-competitive pricing of essential 
telecommunications facilities in telecoms. The relevant legal obligations are assumed by WTO 
Members, who must enforce them on private entities through the so-called “Reference Paper” that is 
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incorporated in Members’ Schedules to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in 
accordance with the 1997 Agreement on Trade in Basic Telecommunications Services. In Japan-
Semiconductors, a GATT panel held that activities not performed by a state but which can be 
attributed to it should come under the ambit of the GATT. The key to attribution is the response to the 
question “would the challenged behaviour have occurred absent incentives by the government to 
behave in this way”? Governments thus do not need to compel behaviour. It suffices that they 
“incentivize” private agents to behave in a particular way in order to be themselves accountable before 
the WTO (2017). 
If we want more transparency through the WTO, we need an agreed understanding of the problem, 
hence agreement on what to be transparent about. In WTO Members only notify what it is agreed they 
should notify, and not always even that. The absence of specific WTO disciplines on SOEs, including 
the absence of a definition, leads to the absence of transparency requirements about who they are and 
what they do. Multilateral consensus on new rules might prove elusive, but an SOEs Reference Paper 
on the model of the Telecoms Reference Paper, or the one Mavroidis and Wolfe (2017) propose for 
private standards, might be a way to make progress. A plurilateral negotiation under the umbrella of 
the WTO as opposed to a PTA would be nondiscriminatory, allowing all interested countries to 
participate, which would ensure that the focus is on issues that all agree are a problem.  
The virtue of a Reference Paper as a negotiating modality is that the results can be inscribed in the 
Schedules of participating Members. It enters into force when a pre-defined critical mass is reached, 
with no need for consensus among all Members, or formal ratification at home.
11
 Critical mass would 
require the participation of key OECD countries, plus the major emerging market homes of SOEs. The 
negotiations would need to agree on a definition of the domain of the Reference Paper, decide on 
transparency procedures, and create a committee. The committee would be crucial—it could exert 
pressure on participants to comply with their notification requirements; it would also provide 
occasions to ask about errors and omissions in notification due to ambiguous definitions, which will be 
the case with SOEs. 
A Reference Paper might also offer a simpler approach to creating disciplines for what after all are 
the anti-competitive actions of firms, which goes beyond the possibility of subsidization. If using 
national competition policy to ensure “competitive neutrality” is the most important objective (Pérez 
Motta, 2016), then transparency about SOEs would be part of any WTO negotiation on competition 
policy, whenever it might start.  
Negotiations on SOEs would also need to consider linkages to procurement disciplines. Levy in his 
article in this issue draws attention to concerns expressed during China’s WTO accession negotiations 
about SOEs as purchasers—do their government mandates include a requirement to purchase locally 
in ways that discriminate against foreign suppliers? Are Chinese purchasers making decisions solely 
on standard commercial considerations, such as quality and price, or does government provide 
direction? Other WTO Members would be more inclined to believe the assurances China made on this 
point when it joined the WTO (WTO, 2001, para 46) if we had more transparency about the operations 
of SOEs. TPP excludes government procurement from the scope of the SOEs chapter (Article 17.2.7) 
but has many provisions requiring that SOEs use commercial considerations in making their purchases.  
In WTO, we might get such transparency if China accedes to the Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA), and if SOEs would then be listed in Appendix 1 of the GPA. If the major SOEs 
were subject to the GPA, under its transparency procedures we would know a great deal about their 
purchasing decisions both in general and with respect to specific procurements (Mavroidis, 2016a, 
section 10.7). During the negotiations on accession to the GPA, which have yet to conclude, including 
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SOEs in China's revised offers was a key ask among the more engaged members, according to one 
negotiator, who suspects that the reason China was reticent to include substantive obligations with 
regard to regard to SOEs was precisely to shelter them from opening up large procurement contracts to 
foreign bidders—major infrastructure projects, for example are procured not by ministries but by 
SOEs they control (Wang, 2009, 678). Including them in the GPA might also constitute an admission 
that they are “public bodies”, which could affect how they are treated in trade remedy investigations. 
In any event in 2015 China said that it would not be able to make a new GPA offer until ongoing 
reforms of SOEs were complete (Inside U.S. Trade, 2015). 
Information is not free, and disclosure can be awkward. Are the incentives of the major players 
aligned? Put differently, why should China participate in a Reference Paper on SOEs? At the broadest 
level, restrictions imposed because trading partners fear the motives of Chinese SOEs disrupt the 
investment strategies of those firms, and hence their participation in sophisticated global value chains. 
If everybody involved knew more, and had a space to discuss what they know, they might be more 
relaxed. (One can see the potential for such balancing in OECD recommendations that call for “high 
standards of governance, disclosure, accountability and transparency for SOEs” while also seeing the 
need for host policies to be “non-discriminatory and transparent towards SOEs (OECD, 2016a, 15).” 
More narrowly, as we saw above in the case of Canada, and as we have seen in decisions taken by the 
United States, the fact of SOEs is part of the story about how China does not operate as a market 
economy, which becomes a justification for continued application of the provisions in Article 15 of 
China’s accession protocol (WT/L/432) permitting an alternative methodology in trade remedy cases. 
Here too more information might help to resolve uncertainty. Everyone needs to know more about 
SOEs, and the WTO provides neutral ground. 
Why do we need more sunshine over Shanghai? 
Every tool of governance has an (implicit) conception of the definition of the problem, the objective, 
the nature of society, and legal authority. Instruments can be embodied in public agencies, SOEs, or 
private firms. Sometimes economic actors will seem like agents of government in implementing a 
particular policy, for example when commercial banks implement a government student loan program 
or a construction company builds and runs a new toll highway. It is a commonplace to define as 
“public” anything that is not “private”, but as we see in the TPP, TTIP and TiSA debates about what 
makes an entity sufficiently state-owned to be subject to discipline, the distinction breaks down in 
practice. The TPP chapter has exceptions for non-conforming measures, which counties could list in 
an Annex. Canada exempted the public broadcaster (CBC), the mortgage insurance agency (CMHC), 
and certain bridge authorities. The U.S. exempted federal funding for housing and infrastructure. That 
is, countries have views on the legitimate role of the state, and views on which of those purposes 
should be subject to international discipline. As Canada’s Minister of International Trade said in praise 
of improvements to the investment provisions of CETA (Canada, 2016b, 12), “We clarified that it was 
the job of democratically elected states, and not of a trade agreement, to choose which parts of the 
economy should be in the private sector and which should be in the public sector…. ” Acceptance of 
such difference is embedded in the norms and practices of the trade regime. 
North Americans tend to see the SOE challenge in regulatory terms. As Canada’s Chief Negotiator 
for TPP told a House of Commons committee (Canada, 2016a), “All of these rules that we've put in 
the TPP are rules that our state-owned enterprises have to play by. All of our crown corporations have 
to play by these rules already. We have put them in the TPP in an effort to have other countries also 
have a similar standard.” But does that objective concern the end state for the role of SOEs in the 
economy, or the means to get there? Trade people prefer performance over design standards, but 
neither approach may be appropriate given the diversity of SOEs, the objectives assigned to them by 
states, and the ways in which states support them. Maybe just being better able to observe their actions 
would be enough. We might like alignment between OECD countries and China on how SOEs are 
regulated, but shared guidelines would be an improvement. But mere publication of a list of SOEs may 
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not help us understand the process through which SOEs exercise their functions. We need something 
like a committee, where OECD SOEs are also on the table, so that consensual understanding about 
best practices, and relations of trust, can emerge. 
I agree with Mavroidis that the GATT/WTO system is a set of solutions to problems in commercial 
relations between states, which fits well with the familiar notion that the system is a contract 
(Mavroidis, 2016b). But what kind of contract? The framers knew that they could not specify the 
thousands of domestic policies to which the rules might apply, nor could they imagine the evolution of 
such policies, hence the WTO is necessarily an incomplete contract. For many economists the idea is 
that because we are repeat players, we do not have to be specific and we can also tolerate some anti-
contractual behaviour either because we believe in future reciprocity, or because occasional deviations 
matter less than keeping the contract alive. The trading system is also, Mavroidis therefore says, a 
relational contract. The Members’ relationship is ongoing and hence is dependent on building and 
maintaining relations of trust. The explicit terms of the contract are just an outline as implicit terms 
and understandings determine the behaviour of the parties. Conversely, in areas where the parties lack 
consensual understanding of the issues, and relations of trust are yet to emerge, premature efforts to 
complete the contract, to create binding rules through negotiations or formal disputes, are unlikely to 
succeed (Wolfe, 2015). Regulation of SOEs is just such an issue. 
Transparency is likely to be a better discipline on the spillovers associated with SOEs than a search 
for binding rules (Shaffer, Wolfe and Le, 2015), while also helping everyone better understand the 
effects on economic efficiency. And it might help with generating the information needed to assess 
what may be the biggest challenge with Chinese SOEs—the possibility that a sudden inability to pay 
their possibly massive debts causes a global financial crisis, which is why we need to illuminate the 
murky world of Chinese SOEs.  
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